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LPR Technology Public Comment from John McDonald9:11 .1 ^. 03 l�llullloi��'((�°gip 2 People Ness Ryan I'°°°Ilunter Received these texts tonight that we should probably include as public comment. Sent to myself, Kyle, Sid, Kari and Wes. Good evening and I'm sorry for the late text. My name is John Mc- Donnell and I am the resident that has been speaking highly against these ALPR technologies systems that are aninn to he in Good evening and I'm sorry for the late text. My name is John McDonnell and I am the resident that has been speaking highly against these ALPR technologies systems that are going to be in place based upon your upcoming vote on the budget below in the next text, I will attach multiple laws both Montana and federal that I think in my opinion will be broken if these technologies advance any further, you also may or may not know, but I have distributed a questionnaire for all of the council members as well as the city chief that I am expecting thoughtful written answers in the space provided below each question and I expect them to be returned to me on Monday night before the meeting. I will also attach a multitude of different both federal and lower court cases that have upheld DALPR/Private violation/4th amendment Wright violation for your review. I look forward to your dedicated and engaging response in this upcoming next city council meeting on Monday night. Any council member who refuses or is unwilling to provide answers to my written questions or do some basic research on these laws and these court cases will face the unprecedented public shaming that they deserve. Thank you and have a good night and I hope you can do better. I'm sorry for the late text. Please spread the word. 9:10 .1 ^ m (010,0111 2 People Federal Level (Pri- marily Fourth Amend- ment . U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment: Protects against unrea- sonable searches and seizures. ALPR syste... > recommend you all in- form yourselfand do some background ire - search and basic re- search, upon the cases in laws that I've just provided you have the weekend to do some review and I expect thm inhtfi all r ptailPri rP— Federal Level (Primarily Fourth Amendment) • U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment: Protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. ALPR systems raise issues when they enable long-term, warrantless tracking of vehicle movements (creating a "mosaic" of public movements), especially if data is aggregated, retained, or queried without probable cause or a warrant. Single "plain view" captures of license plates on public roads are generally not considered searches, but comprehensive historical databases or pervasive surveillance may trigger protections. No comprehensive federal statute strictly regulates ALPR use nationwide; oversight is largely constitutional and agency -specific (e.g., data retention policies). State Level (Montana Example, as Relevant to Kalispell) Montana has specific statutes on ALPR: • Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-117 to § 46-5-118: Governs law enforcement use of ALPR. Requires written policies, limits data retention (generally 1 year unless preserved for investigation), restricts sharing/sale of data, and mandates destruction of non -investigative data. Bulk collection without ties to active investigations may violate these limits or related privacy provisions. • Broader Montana constitutional privacy protections (Mont. Const. Art. II, § 10) may offer stronger safeguards than the federal Fourth Amendment in some interpretations. Other states have varying retention limits (e.g., 30-180 days), public records access rules, or bans/restrictions on private/third-party data sharing. Deployment could test compliance with state public records acts or data minimization requirements. Note: Legality often depends on specifics—e.g., fixed vs. mobile cameras, data retention duration, query practices, and whether it creates comprehensive location histories. Courts distinguish short-term/plain-view use (generally upheld) from long-term surveillance (more vulnerable). Key U.S. Supreme Court Cases (Analogous, Not Direct ALPR Rulings) No U.S. Supreme Court case has directly ruled on ALPR technology. Relevant precedents often cited: • Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018): Warrant required for historical cell -site location information (CSLI) due to its revealing nature and reasonable expectation of privacy in aggregated movements. Frequently invoked for ALPR "mosaic theory" arguments (long-term tracking invades privacy). • United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012): GIPS tracking on a vehicle constitutes a search (trespass theory); concurrences by Alito and Sotomayor highlight privacy concerns with prolonged surveillance. • Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): Established "reasonable expectation of privacy" test; what is knowingly exposed to the public (e.g., license plates in plain view) generally lacks protection. • Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 747 (2020): Reasonable suspicion for a stop can arise from license plate database info (e.g., revoked license), but does not directly address ALPR databases. Lower courts often distinguish ALPR from Carpenter -level intrusion due to less comprehensive/intimate data than cell phones. Notable Lower Court Cases (Supporting Limits or Challenges to ALPR) Cases supporting restrictions or finding potential violations (often limited or ongoing): • Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 Mass. 493 (Mass. 2020): Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held limited ALPR use (e.g., few cameras) did not violate rights, but explicitly warned that "with enough cameras in enough locations;' historical ALPR data would constitute a search requiring a warrant under state/federal constitutions. Strong support for challenging pervasive systems. • Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (E.D. Va., 2026; appealed to 4th Cir.): Challenge to citywide Flock Safety ALPR network (hundreds of captures per vehicle). District court upheld use, but appeal tests Fourth Amendment claims of warrantless mass surveillance. Institute for Justice case highlighting privacy concerns. • United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2020): Court avoided full merits but acknowledged massive ALPR data scale; standing limited the challenge. Amicus briefs from EFF/ACLU pushed Carpenter application. • Other federal district court cases and state rulings have cautioned that sustained tracking or highly comprehensive ALPR databases could cross into unconstitutional territory, especially when combined with other tools. Many other federal trial and state courts have upheld specific ALPR uses to date (e.g., short-term or investigative queries), but with caveats about future pervasive deployment. Challenges continue in places like San Jose, CA, and Virginia. I recommend you all inform yourself and do some background research and basic research upon the cases in laws that I've just provided you have the weekend to do some review and I expect thoughtful detailed responses from each of you on Monday night. Because if you are not opposed to these cameras in full, then you are breaking the law. Again, I'm sorry for the late text however I do pay my taxes so I am allowed to do this and I hope you guys understand and I look forward to your responses on Monday night, both written and verbal because I will have more questions for all of you both written and verbal at the end of the meeting.